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1. Introduction 
 
In the wake of the unexpectedly deep recession in Greece that followed the austerity policies 
agreed upon between the country, the IMF and the European Union [IMF 2012, 2013a,b], a 
public discussion started on whether an alternative, less restrictive economic policy would 
have had better results.  This discussion became even more heated following the publication 
of the IMF report by Blanchard and Leigh [2013], where the GDP – government surplus 
multiplier was re-estimated upwards.  It was argued in the press, see for instance the article by 
H. Schneider in the Washington Post [2013], that the drop in Greece’s GDP projected in the 
IMF’s Debt Sustainability Calculations [IMF 202, 2013a,b] was in error, since it relied on too 
low a value of the multiplier.  
 
This note is an analysis of the dynamical aspects of the GDP / government surplus multiplier.  
Several expressions for the multiplier appear in the literature in terms of more fundamental 
macroeconomic parameters - see Woodford [2010] or the Wikipedia article on the Fiscal 
Multiplier for a summary presentation.  We will assume that the multiplier is constant, 
exogenously given, and we will focus on its policy implications, namely whether the value of 
the multiplier has any relevance on the choice of government budget policy.  We will show 
the (at first) counterintuitive result that in order to reduce Debt/GDP, countries with high Debt 
to GDP should go into further debt, as long as the Debt to GDP ratio is roughly greater than 
the inverse of the  multiplier.  Thus small values of the multiplier make further debt 
undesirable, and vice versa.   
 
The models used here are simple and the result is essentially an exercise in economic 
dynamics.  However the policy implications are of some importance as long as any type of 
multiplier effect is valid. 
 
2. One period analysis 
 
Assume that the total debt of a country at the end of year t is Dt, while the same year’s GDP is 
Gt (in nominal terms).  We assume that the entire debt is in the national currency.  If the 
interest rate during year t is rt, and Xt are the debt payment we have by definition  
 
Dt=Dt-1(1+rt)-Xt      (1) 
 
If the GDP deflator is pt and g΄t the real GDP growth we have  
 
Gt=Gt-1(1+g΄t)(1+pt)=(1+gt)Gt-1      (2)  
 
where gt=(1+ g΄t)(1+pt) -1.   
 
Denoting by dt the ratio Dt/Gt (debt to GDP ratio), dividing (1) by (2) and setting xt=Xt/Gt we 
have the equation   
 
      
dt=dt-1(1+rt)/(1+gt)-xt       (3) 
 
The interest and capital payments Xt arise from government primary surpluses, income from 
privatizations and other sources, including autonomous debt reductions.   
 
The concept of the multiplier between GDP and government surplus is used to capture the 
recessionary effect of budget surpluses.  Thus if xt
nom, gt
nom
 are the nominal scenario 
assumptions of some economic plan, we assume that a change xt in the nominal surplus will 
cause a change in growth gt=-xt,  being the fiscal multiplier (expected to be a positive 
number).  Hence a change xt in primary surplus will cause a GDP growth of gt= gt
nom-xt .   
 
To see the total effect of a change in primary surplus, look at first order changes, i.e. assume 
that the g’s are small compared to 1 (an exact analysis would give essentially the same 
results).  In that case the fundamental dynamics in (3) simplify to    
 
dt=dt-1(1+rt -gt) - xt       (4) 
 
Setting xt= xt
nom+xt and hence gt= gt
nom-xt we have  
dt=dt-1(1+ rt - gt
nom+xt) - xt
nom - xt  or 
 
dt=dt-1(1+ rt - gt
nom) - xt
nom +(dt-1-1)xt     (5) 
 
To better see the effect of changes in primary surplus consider the dynamics in (4) as a 
nominal debt trajectory dnomt which satisfies 
 
dnomt= d
nom
t-1(1+rt -g
nom
t) - x
nom
t       (4’) 
 
Subtracting (4’) from (5) and setting  dt=dt-d
nom
t we have the dynamics 
 
dt=dt-1(1+ rt - gt
nom) +(dt-1-1)xt    (6) 
 
The last equation and in particular its last term shows that in case the coefficient of the change 
in primary surplus (with respect to some nominal scenario) is positive, the primary surplus 
should decrease in order to decrease the debt to GDP ratio for the current year, and vice versa.  
Thus, primary surpluses should decrease in case dt-1>1 or equivalently dt-1>1/.  For 
multipliers of the order of 1, and debts well over 100%, a decrease of primary surpluses 
seems to be in order.  Conversely, small multiplier values, e.g. 80% make the debt criterion 
more stringent. 
 
3. Multiperiod analysis 
 
The impact of a change xt in the primary surplus from period t to period t+ assuming no 
changes in the intervening periods is the change at t dt=(d
nom
t-1-1)xt  (assuming that     
dnomt-1=dt-1) multiplied by the product of the factors (1+ rt+j - gt+j
nom), that is 
 
dt+=(d
nom
t-1-1)xt ∏             
         
 
In case there are changes in the primary surpluses in future periods, to first order these effects 
are additive and thus 
 
dt+=∑      
         ∏             
          
   
     (7) 
 
 
 
      
4. A numerical example   
 
Consider the following dynamics rt=3%, gt=2% for all t, d0=100 and x
nom
t=2 for all t, i.e. a 
country with a debt of 100% its GDP, a growth rate of 2%, and debt interest rate 3%.  A direct 
calculation using (3) gives a debt to GDP in the tenth year equal to d10= 89,34.  We take a 
fiscal multiplier equal to 2 and examine a change in the surplus x1=1. Then a direct 
calculation results in d10= 90,45 which a change d10=1,11.  The first order approximation 
derived above in (6) is (2*100-100)*((1+3%)/(1+2%))
9 
= 1,09 which is accurate to first 
order.   
 
Similarly a surplus change in the fourth period equal to x4 =-1 results in d10= 88,40 i.e. 
d10= -0,94.  The approximation in equation (7) gives (2*96,9-100)*(-1)(1,03/1,02)
5=-0,98, 
since dnom4=96,9.  Finally a change of the above magnitudes at both times 1 and 4 gives after 
direct calculation d10=89,50 with a change 0,16 which is approximately the sum of the 
differences 1,09 and -0,94, as stated in equation (7). 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Although economic policy considerations, especially in crisis times, are perhaps too 
complicated to be amenable to quantitative analyses, the above remarks might be of interest in 
order to assess small changes in policies that are necessary to fine tune agreements like those 
of the Memorandum between the IMF, the European Union and Greece. In such a case, the 
strong assumptions used in the above analysis might be plausible. 
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